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We examine the role of social norms and warm-glow in a theoretical framework and 7 
establish that improving the quality of recycling facilities, for example through 8 
kerbside collection, will elicit more recycling effort if warm-glow is present. Drawing 9 
on the literature, we model the role of social norms with reference to age profile, 10 
ethnicity and geographical location of the reference group. Using English local 11 
authority data, we show that a social norm for recycling does exist. We find the 12 
expected relationship between the quality of kerbside provision and recycling activity 13 
if the household derives warm-glow from the activity, however it is insignificant. 14 
Amongst the control variables we find evidence that multifamily dwellings recycle 15 
less.  16 
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1. Introduction 26 
Traditionally, the economics literature on the theory of incentives has focused 27 
entirely on the relative price effect of economic instruments (Fehr and Falk, 2002). It 28 
is widely accepted that desirable behaviour can be promoted by making monetary 29 
rewards/punishments contingent on performance (see e.g. Callan and Thomas, 1997; 30 
Jenkins, 1993; Hong, 1999; Hong et al., 1993; Sidique, et al., 2010). More recently 31 
there is increasing recognition that individuals are not solely concerned with monetary 32 
pay-offs, and non-monetary levers may be used to induce desirable actions (e.g. Frey, 33 
1999). Such interventions appeal to the Psychological literature, which gives 34 
prominence to the role of non-pecuniary drivers of pro-environmental behaviour, such 35 
as the different norms of behaviour – social, moral, legal, as well as altruism, 36 
warm-glow and eco-centrism (Barr et al., 2001; De Young, 1996).1 Pro-37 
environmental behaviour in general, and recycling in particular, has provided a fertile 38 
area in which to examine such motives. Recycling can be individually costly, in terms 39 
of the opportunity cost of time, and provides an apparently low pay-off in terms of 40 
individual environmental benefit and yet individuals still choose to recycle even in the 41 
absence of any monetary incentive. Recent attempts to incorporate psychological 42 
determinants of recycling behaviour within an economic framework include Brekke et 43 
al., 2003, 2007, 2010; Hage et al., 2009; Halvorsen, 2008.2 The issues raised in this 44 
paper have not only been confined to research traditions within Economics and 45 
Psychology. For example, contributions within Sociology have grappled with the 46 
                                                 
1 Barr et al. (2001) do not use the term warm-glow. In their discussion of the intrinsic motive to recycle 
it is clear that this is what they are referring to. However, in their empirical analysis the intrinsic motive 
to recycle captures both enjoyment and belief on the part of the respondent of the efficacy of their 
action and so does not represent warm-glow alone. 
2 In the wider context non-monetary motives have been examined in a variety of contexts such as 
volunteering (Meier and Stutzer, 2008); the labour market (Akerlof, 1982); tax compliance (Graetz and 
Wilde, 1985), common pool resources (Ostrom, 2000), public goods (Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997), 
charitable donations (Andreoni, 1990; Atkinson, 2009).  
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notion of norms (Gibbs, 1965) and their evolution over time (Bendor and Swistak, 47 
2001). Within the wider context of waste management, the geographic scale at which 48 
industrial recycling should take place (Lyons, 2007) and issues of civic duty and 49 
identity and how they relate to recycling behaviour have been addressed within the 50 
geography literature (Riley, 2008). 51 
The move towards considering non-monetary motives and potential 52 
interventions that take account of the myriad of reasons why people behave the way 53 
they do is also reflected in the policy context. For example, in 2010, the UK 54 
government set up the Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team whose remit is to 55 
‘find innovative ways of encouraging, enabling and supporting people to make better 56 
choice for themselves’.3 As well, in its recent review of waste policy, the central 57 
government expressed the intention of removing the ability of local government to 58 
fine households for presenting their waste incorrectly or on the wrong day. Current 59 
legislation in the UK specifically rules out charging households on a per unit basis for 60 
the waste they generate.4 However, the current government are very much in favour 61 
of rewarding households for recycling, e.g. through vouchers that can be redeemed for 62 
goods at local shops.5 Other countries are also trying to better understand behaviour 63 
with a view to reducing household impact on the environment (OECD, 2008).  64 
We aim to examine further the underlying motives to recycle and contribute to 65 
the literature through incorporating social preferences into an economic framework.6 66 
Section 2 describes the primary non-monetary motives underlying pro-environmental 67 
behaviour such as recycling. Section 3 discusses the potential interaction between 68 
                                                 
3 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/behavioural-insights-team, accessed 16/11/12. 
4 http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/local-authorities/controlled-waste-regs/, accessed 
19/11/12 
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10251696, accessed 19/11/12 
6 This does not imply that other motives are not potentially important but we concentrate on those we 
consider to be key in the context of recycling.  
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motives and government interventions. Section 4 presents the theoretical model and 69 
generates a set of testable hypotheses. Section 5 presents the econometric model, the 70 
data used for estimation and estimation results, while section 6 provides concluding 71 
remarks. 72 
 73 
2. Warm glow and social norms 74 
Our reference points for warm-glow are Deci (1971) in the Psychology 75 
literature and Andreoni (1990) from the Economics literature. Accordingly, an 76 
individual can derive enjoyment from an activity independent of any consideration of 77 
outcome.7 Clark et al. (2003) define ‘warm-glow’ as the personal satisfaction arising 78 
from an activity independent of its impact. Although De Young (1996) does not use 79 
the term warm-glow, it is akin to the intrinsic satisfaction an individual enjoys from 80 
being actively involved in an activity. He states, that although certain forms of 81 
behaviour bring personal contentment and may focus on issues outside the self, 82 
nevertheless the ‘proximate mechanism is self-interest’ (De Young, 2000, p. 516). De 83 
Young (1996) argues that it is intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation that is the 84 
primary motivator to act in a particular way and that the former has a longer term 85 
effect on behaviour. 86 
Social norms are shared perceptions of ideal forms of behaviour to which 87 
individuals try to conform (Burke and Young, 2011; Ostrom, 2000). Fishbein and 88 
Ajzen (1975) state that awareness and acceptance of a social norm is likely to modify 89 
behaviour accordingly. Biccheri (2006) further refined the notion of social norms, 90 
arguing that the two necessary conditions for standards of behaviour to qualify as 91 
social norms are that (i) a sufficiently large proportion of the population recognises 92 
                                                 
7 Other contributors that have defined warm-glow in the same way as Andreoni include Palfrey and 
Prisbrey (1997) who state that, independent of how much it benefits others, the act generating 
‘warm-glow’ increases the individual’s utility by a fixed amount. 
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the particular modes of behaviour and can identify the situations to which they apply 93 
and (ii) individuals are predisposed towards complying with them. Predisposition 94 
towards compliance is in turn dependent on the degree of conformity amongst the 95 
population and the level of expectation that the individual conforms. These latter two 96 
conditions rely on the beliefs that an individual holds about what other people actually 97 
do (descriptive norms) and what other people expect him/her to do (injunctive norms). 98 
Thørgersen (2008) finds support for the idea that these beliefs are complementary to 99 
each other and each has to be present to a sufficient degree for cooperative behaviour 100 
occur. Injunctive norms are assumed to influence behaviour because of others’ ability 101 
to exert sanctions in the event of non-compliance (Thørgersen, 2008). However, 102 
sanctions are not always required (Biccheri, 2006; Elster, 1989). Either social norms 103 
become internalised so that they do not require an external sanction mechanism or, in 104 
the light of the discussion above, the degree of conformity amongst the population 105 
and the level of expectation are sufficiently high for compliance without the need for 106 
the threat of external sanctions. 107 
The observation that households recycle, even in the absence of monetary 108 
incentives to do so, suggests that there are some other motives at work. Kinnaman 109 
(2006) suggests that this motive has to do with warm-glow and notes that not only do 110 
households recycle but they are even willing to pay for the opportunity to recycle.8 111 
Berglund (2006) illustrates this desire to recycle by measuring the difference between 112 
the opportunity cost of time spent recycling, given by the net hourly wage, and the 113 
stated willingness to pay for someone else to carry out the activities involved in 114 
                                                 
8 In some countries, e.g. the UK there is no charging allowed for recycling or residual waste collections 
and funding comes from government sources. Consequently, households perceive the marginal cost of 
all units of waste disposed after the first as zero (Callan and Thomas, 2006). Thus, there is no monetary 
incentive for households to minimize waste production or to increase its recycling rate. 
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recycling. Since individuals appear to derive private benefit from recycling they are 115 
willing to pay less for someone else to do it. 116 
Other contributions from the economics recycling literature, have tended to link 117 
social norms and warm-glow together. Halvorsen (2008) assumes that warm-glow is 118 
derived from adherence to social and moral norms so that norms and warm-glow are 119 
inseparable. Brekke et al. (2003) identify warm-glow with a positive self-image and 120 
self-image depends on the degree to which individuals believe their behaviour is 121 
socially responsible. The benchmark for socially responsible behaviour is a moral 122 
ideal, endogenously determined by the individual as that effort which maximises 123 
social welfare if everyone acted like them. In Brekke et al. (2007; 2010), the 124 
benchmark is a social rather than a moral norm and so is determined exogenously and 125 
a positive self-image or warm-glow depends on the gap between an individual’s level 126 
of recycling and the social norm. In Brekke et al. (2007; 2010) the existence and 127 
acknowledgement of a social norm can impose a burden on the individual. So, 128 
although increasing the level of recycling increases warm-glow along the lines of 129 
Andreoni (1990), an increase in perceived responsibility decreases warm-glow. Thus, 130 
if this perceived responsibility, as reflected in the social norm, is kept fixed then ‘duty 131 
orientation is behaviourally indistinguishable from a warm-glow model’ (Brekke et 132 
al., 2010, p. 766). Although Hage et al. (2009) adopt the approach of linking self-133 
image to social norms there is no mention of warm-glow in their model. 134 
 135 
3. Policy – crowding out/crowding in 136 
The policy relevance of identifying and assessing underlying motives to behave in 137 
particular ways derives from potential interactions between external interventions – 138 
monetary and non-monetary – and these motives. The interaction between 139 
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non-monetary motives and external interventions can render certain policies less 140 
effective (crowding-out) and others more effective (crowding-in) (Frey and Jegen, 141 
2001). Thus, understanding the interaction between non-monetary motives and 142 
external policy instruments - whether they act as substitutes or complements (Bowles 143 
and Hwang, 2008) - is critical to successful policy implementation. The literature 144 
suggests that excluding consideration of non-monetary motives can lead to 145 
unexpected results. In a seminal experiment, Deci (1971) established the existence of 146 
intrinsic motivation to perform a task and found that monetary payments contingent 147 
on performance reduced the intrinsic motivation to carry out the task. Non-contingent 148 
monetary payments left intrinsic motivation intact, whereas positive verbal feedback 149 
increased intrinsic motivation. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) in a study on 150 
willingness to accept siting of a nuclear facility within a community found that the 151 
offer of monetary compensation actually reduced the proportion of people willing to 152 
accept the facility and their willingness did not increase with the size of the 153 
compensation. These results have been explained by Bowles (2008), who argues 154 
monetary incentives are framed in such a way as to induce self-interest as a response. 155 
We can also refer to this as a relative price effect, where individuals choose the 156 
response that is more financially rewarding. The self-determination effect or over-157 
justification effect, occurs when an individual’s own interest in performing the 158 
activity is discounted because they are given an external reason for doing something 159 
they would have done anyway (Rotter, 1966; Thøgersen, 2003). With a payment, 160 
individuals have no way of demonstrating their willingness to accept change or 161 
perform an activity for reasons other than monetary ones. Thus, these effects move in 162 
opposite directions and the overall effect will depend on which one dominates. Such 163 
motivational crowding-out not only reduces the effectiveness of policy but may 164 
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reduce activity below the pre-policy level.  To correct for this, the government has to 165 
offer a higher payment than would otherwise be the case (Thøgersen, 2003). Also, the 166 
erosion of intrinsic motivation tends to be permanent because once a payment is 167 
introduced the activity is no longer performed when payment is withdrawn. To 168 
illustrate this, Deci (1971) provides the example of a boy cutting the lawn for his 169 
father. Once the father agrees to pay for the lawn to be cut, the boy is no longer 170 
willing to do it without payment. It appears that crowding-out is much more likely 171 
with monetary incentives (Bowles 2008; Thøgersen 2003). In the case of non-172 
monetary interventions, Deci’s (1971) experiments suggest that non-monetary 173 
interventions can either leave intrinsic motivation intact or increase it. 174 
 175 
4. The Model 176 
We take a different approach to conceptualising social norms and warm-glow to that 177 
taken by Brekke et al. (2003) and Halvorsen (2008). Following Andreoni (1990) and 178 
Deci (1971), we define warm-glow as purely intrinsic. According to Thøgersen 179 
(2003), pro-social behaviour is carried out to ‘attain some separable outcome’ (Ryan 180 
and Deci, 2000; p.71) such as peer approval and so, is an extrinsic motivation (Hornik 181 
et al., 1995). We will also consider the role of the public good motive, which is 182 
characteristic of Andreoni’s (1990) altruistic individual. In our model altruism is 183 
reflected through concern for the environment because it impacts on others’ welfare.   184 
We address the role of these three motives: social norms; warm-glow and 185 
environmental concern in the framework of a household utility maximisation model 186 
put forward by Kinnaman and Fullerton (1999). In addition, we incorporate a set of 187 
household socio-economic characteristics, as suggested by the literature. In this 188 
framework, the household has to trade off the utility it derives from a number of 189 
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sources: consumption xit; environmental quality Gt; time spent recycling tRit  and peer 190 
approval pait. Thus, the household’s utility function is given by  191 
);,,,( ititti
R
titit SEVpatGxUU = ,    (1) 192 
where subscripts i and t refer to households and time respectively. Ux > 0; Uxx < 0; 193 
UG > 0; UGG < 0; Upait > 0; U pait pait < 0.9 Socio-economic characteristics SEVit include 194 
age, income, education, number of individuals in the household, type of the household 195 
dwelling etc.  196 
The constraints facing the household relate to time and income. Assuming the 197 
amount of time spent working is fixed, the opportunity cost of time spent recycling is 198 
lost leisure. Total time available to the household is normalised to 1, so that  199 
 1 itit
Rw
it LtT +=− ,     (2) 200 
where witT  and itL  is the time spent at work and leisure respectively.10 Assuming that 201 
the price of the composite good is normalised to 1 and the wage rate is exogenously 202 
given as w, we can write the household’s budget constraint as: 203 
)1( itit
R
it Ltwx −−=      (3) 204 
The relationship between environmental quality and recycling is captured 205 
through the simple function:  206 
∑
=
=
n
i
itt RgG
1
      (4) 207 
Incorporating environmental quality into the utility function reflects general concern 208 
for the environment or altruism. This expression reflects the substitutability between 209 
households’ recycling activities in generating a particular level of environmental 210 
quality. Ceteris paribus, welfare is higher the better the environmental quality and to 211 
                                                 
9 Ux is the first derivative of the utility function with respect to x and Uxx is the second derivative with 
respect to x. The same holds for the other three arguments of the utility function.  
10 Thus 1- Tw is equivalent to LTh in Halvorsen’s (2008) model.  
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the extent that an individual household cares about others’ welfare it cares about the 212 
environment. 213 
Following the modelling approach of Andreoni (1990), warm-glow is accounted 214 
for by inserting time spent recycling directly into the utility function. Warm-glow is 215 
defined as UtR > 0 and we assume that diminishing returns can set in with more and 216 
more time spent recycling i.e. UtRtR < 0; Thus, individuals derive utility from the 217 
recycling activity or process itself, whereas the effect on utility of the recycling level 218 
(outcome of the activity/process) is through the other arguments included in the utility 219 
function: environmental concern, impact on consumption of x and attainment of peer 220 
approval through adherence to a recycling norm. We might think of it as first and 221 
second-order effects of time spent recycling on utility, where warm-glow is a first-222 
order effect.  223 
A key factor in driving up recycling rates is the kerbside scheme (Abbott et al., 224 
2011; Oskamp et al., 1991; Vining and Ebreo, 1990). Kerbside policy provides a 225 
convenient way of considering how policymakers can affect household’s recycling 226 
behaviour through the activation and maintenance of the social norm to recycle and 227 
providing an outlet for, or indeed enhancing, the experience of warm-glow from 228 
recycling. We have seen that Deci (1971) found that non-monetary interventions 229 
could crowd-in intrinsic motivation. Also, De Young (1996) and Thøgersen (2003) 230 
refer to the ability of interventions to increase intrinsic motivation through enhancing 231 
individuals’ perceived competence and sense of autonomy in carrying out particular 232 
activities. The provision of kerbside facilities could be viewed as one such 233 
intervention. Households may find it easier to recycle because kerbside collection 234 
takes place at frequent intervals so that they become familiar with what types of 235 
materials are recyclable. Their learning process is facilitated by information 236 
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campaigns, which are accommodated more easily and made more effective through a 237 
kerbside scheme. By facilitating visibility of recycling efforts, kerbside collection 238 
increases norm awareness, a key factor required for norm compliance (Bicchieri, 239 
2006; Elster, 2009).   240 
Figure 1 illustrates the links between kerbside policy and the household’s 241 
response.  242 
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 243 
It would be difficult to test whether the kerbside scheme crowds-in intrinsic 244 
motivation or warm-glow as we would need to be able to observe the level of 245 
warm-glow before and after the intervention. However, we can test whether 246 
warm-glow exists or not. Just as monetary interventions can give rise to two effects: a 247 
relative-price effect and an over-justification effect, we can think of kerbside 248 
provision giving rise to two effects. We call these two effects an efficiency effect and 249 
a warm-glow effect. We can model the recycling activity in the following way:  250 
( )( )   ,,, itititititkitRit xmfrsqtR θ=    (5) 251 
where θ captures the efficiency of conversion of the consumption good xit to 252 
recyclables and will depend on the time spent recycling tRit and the quality of kerbside 253 
provision itkq . itkq  depends on the interaction between the size of the container sit, 254 
frequency of collection frit, and the number of materials collected mit. We assume 255 
diminishing returns to both time spent recycling and the quality of kerbside provision 256 
θtR > 0, θtRtR < 0 and θqk > 0,θqkqk < 0. We also assume that increasing the quality of 257 
kerbside increases the marginal efficiency of time spent on the activity so that θtR qk > 258 
0. 259 
Ignoring the role of the social norm for the moment and assuming an interior 260 
solution we get the usual condition that the optimal time spent recycling tR* is defined 261 
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where the marginal cost of time spent recycling (forgone consumption of x) is equal to 262 
the marginal benefit in terms of environmental concern and warm-glow respectively:  263 
RRR t
U
t
R
R
G
G
U
t
x
x
U
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂ ,    (6) 264 
where we have dropped the subscripts for notational simplicity. 265 
Within our framework there are only two possible responses to an increase in 266 
the quality of kerbside provision. An improvement in the quality of provision should 267 
cut down the time required to recycle a given amount. This is the efficiency effect. 268 
But, since time spent recycling generates utility per se the household can respond to 269 
an improvement in kerbside provision by increasing the time spent on recycling. This 270 
is the warm-glow effect. The overall effect of quality of kerbside provision on time 271 
spent recycling will depend on which of these two effects dominates. We can deduce 272 
that if the household does not derive any warm-glow from recycling, the only 273 
outcome would be a decrease in time spent recycling following an improvement in 274 
kerbside provision. However, if the overall effect is positive we can infer the presence 275 
of warm-glow. Even in the case where we observe an overall decrease in time spent 276 
recycling, if that reduction is less than what we would expect in the absence of warm-277 
glow we can still infer the presence of warm-glow. We can test this analytically by 278 
differentiating (6) w.r.t. qk to get an expression for the overall effect of kerbside 279 
quality provision on time spent recycling, k
R
q
t
∂
∂
*
. Thus, if k
R
q
t
∂
∂
*
> 0 the warm-glow 280 
effect dominates the efficiency effect and we can unambiguously state that warm-281 
glow is present. Even if k
R
q
t
∂
∂
*
< 0, we can still test the presence of warm-glow using 282 
the time elasticity of kerbside quality, *
*
R
k
k
R
t
q
q
t
∂
∂ . This measures the degree of 283 
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responsiveness of time spent recycling to an improvement in kerbside quality. An 284 
absolute value of time elasticity of kerbside quality less than one indicates that 285 
reduction in time spent recycling does not fully offset the rise in kerbside quality, 286 
indicating the presence of warm-glow. Given certain conditions (equations (3), (4), 287 
(5); warm-glow is intrinsic satisfaction independent of impact and diminishing 288 
marginal returns for x, G and tR) we can establish that .0
*
<
∂
∂
k
R
q
t 11 However, without 289 
specific functional forms we cannot rule out 1*
*
<
∂
∂
R
k
k
R
t
q
q
t .  290 
Turning to peer approval, it is by complying with the social norm that the 291 
household obtains peer approval which generates utility. The social norm is defined as 292 
an average level of recycling for households within a reference group, Ri. As in Azar 293 
(2004), who examines the norm for restaurant tipping, we also make the assumption 294 
that although the social norm represents some kind of average behaviour, the 295 
household’s influence on the norm is negligible, i.e. there are no role models. Thus 296 
the norm can be treated as exogenous. In the theoretical model, the role of the social 297 
norm is incorporated in either one of two ways. Adopting a threshold approach we let 298 
the peer approval effect, pait equal 1 if the household recycles above a certain level 299 
defined by the norm and zero if below. So: 300 



=
≥
<
i
i
itpa
R Rit   1
R Rit    0
     (7) 301 
Thus, the household enjoys peer approval if its recycling is above the norm expressed 302 
as iR , which denotes the average recycling level for the reference group for i. If the 303 
household’s recycling falls below the norm, the household does not obtain peer 304 
approval. Thus, the household’s utility level with peer approval is higher than without. 305 
                                                 
11 Workings are available from authors on request. 
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Thus, we can rewrite constraint (5) to take account of the existence of the norm as 306 
follows:  307 
( )
( )      ),,(,
    ),,(,
iititititit
k
it
R
it
iititititit
k
it
R
it
RxmfrsqtR
RxmfrsqtR
<=
≥=
θ
θ
  (5′) 308 
We can think of the household optimising under two sets of conditions on its 309 
recycling level and whichever yields the highest utility will be the chosen option.  310 
Alternatively, the relationship between a social norm for recycling and peer 311 
approval can be characterised as ( )iitit RRpa −= ϕ  with 312 
( ) ( )  .0 when 0' and  where0 when 0' >≥−=<> zzRRzzz  iit ϕϕ This way of 313 
modelling the influence of a social norm is similar to the approach taken by Azar 314 
(2004). In his case, behaviour converges to a norm reflecting the idea that no one 315 
wants to tip above or below the norm. In our case, we do not think that analogy holds 316 
so closely since if a household is recycling above the norm it is unlikely that they 317 
would respond by recycling less so as to conform to the norm. However, the rate of 318 
response might differ depending on whether the household is above or below the 319 
norm, i.e. ( ) 0'' >zϕ  when z < 0 but ( ) 0'' ≤zϕ  when z > 0. Thus, peer approval rises 320 
at an increasing rate below the norm but if the household’s recycling rate is above the 321 
norm, peer approval rises at a decreasing rate. 322 
Incorporating the effect of the social norm we can approach it either by the 323 
household maximising the utility function subject to (3), (4) and (5′) with the 324 
household choosing whichever level of time spent recycling gives it the highest 325 
utility. Alternatively, assuming separability between peer approval and the other 326 
arguments of the utility function we get (dropping subscripts): 327 
( )RRtGxUU R −+= ϕ),,(      (1′) 328 
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So (6) becomes 329 
RRR t
U
t
R
R
G
G
U
t
x
x
U
∂
∂
+
∂
∂





 +
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂ 'ϕ     (6′) 330 
where 'ϕ  is the first derivative. 331 
 332 
5. Empirical model and results 333 
In the empirical model, we capture the role of peer approval implicitly through 334 
adherence to a social norm. We would expect that the higher the social norm to 335 
recycle, the higher the recycling level. It also emerged from the theoretical model that 336 
if by improving the kerbside scheme we observed an increase in time spent recycling 337 
we could deduce that warm-glow is present. Finally, we expect concern for the 338 
environment to increase recycling. 339 
We use data on household recycling volumes and determinants from a panel of 340 
317 English local authorities, over the period 2006Q2 to 2008Q4.12 A local authority 341 
is the form of sub-central government in the UK, which has responsibility for 342 
environmental policy as well as other government activities. While individual 343 
household data might be preferable, particularly when modelling intra-governmental 344 
variation in household recycling, such a dataset was not available to us. However, we 345 
are able to analyse the variation in recycling across all the regions of one country. 346 
These variations in recycling performance are wide and significant (Abbott et al., 347 
2011). Moreover, we can ascertain the importance of recycling policy, which is an 348 
important driver of the kerbside quality variable defined in (5).13 349 
                                                 
12 This dataset which formed one of the outputs from ESRC project ‘Examining variation in recycling 
across UK’ (RES-000-22-3738) is available from the UK ESDS archive. 
13 Surveys attempt to elicit from the respondent how they feel about an activity using a ranking scale to 
reflect strength of agreement with a particular statement such as ‘I find recycling is a pleasant activity 
in itself’ (e.g. Halvorsen, 2008; p. 513). The use of surveys enables better targeting of relevant 
questions, however it is not without its drawbacks. As well as being limited in geographical coverage, a 
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 Our econometric model is thus: 350 
  (8) 351 
Where rit is the log of recycling volume per capita for local authority i at time period 352 
t, y denotes the log of median household income (constant prices); ht is a proxy for 353 
housing type (the proportion of the housing stock accounted for by flats); heq 354 
indicates the proportion of the population with a higher education qualification; kq is a 355 
measure of kerbside quality, defined as the ratio of recycling capacity (size of 356 
container × no. of materials) to the length of time between collections. According to 357 
our theory we can unambiguously assert that warm-glow is present if an increase in 358 
the quality of kerbside provision increases the time spent recycling. In the 359 
interpretation of β4 due to the absence of data on time spent recycling, we make the 360 
link between recycling volume and the time spent recycling.14  In the theoretical 361 
model, adherence to the social norm implies peer approval, which generates utility for 362 
the individual. In the empirical model, we focus on how the existence of a social 363 
norm, which we denote as sn, affects recycling behaviour. Specifically, sn is defined 364 
through the mean recycling volume of a reference group of local authorities and so 365 
measures the responsiveness of the recycling volume of a particular local authority to 366 
its reference group. Reference groups are defined according to socio-economic 367 
characteristics or locality. Earlier examples of how norms can be culture and age 368 
dependent include Stoodley (1959) and Neugarten et al. (1965), respectively. In 369 
education, Summers and Wolfe (1977) and Henderson et al. (1978) found that other 370 
                                                                                                                                            
potential inconsistency between actual and stated preferences can arise, with stated preferences an 
unreliable predictor of actual behaviour (Barr et al., 2001; Cummings et al., 1995; Fox et al., 1998; List 
and Shogren, 1998; Neill et al., 1994). In the recycling literature, the unreliability of self-reporting of 
recycling behaviour is documented in Corral-Verdugo (1997) and Obregon-Salido and Corral-Verdugo 
(1997). 
 
14 The assumption being that the more time spent recycling the greater the recycling volume. Over 
some range this is a reasonable assumption, although diminishing returns are likely at some point. 
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things being equal, performance of students was better if their fellow students were 371 
high achievers. Thus, the influence of age related norms on individual behaviour has 372 
been studied in other contexts. The importance of locality in shaping norms has been 373 
examined by Fornara et al. (2011). The idea put forward there is that individuals 374 
living in close proximity to each other (not confined to within household) will behave 375 
more alike than those living far apart. This effect, they argue is stronger when the 376 
behaviour under consideration, e.g. recycling has a place-specific basis. Oskamp et al. 377 
(1991) also found a similar result although the variable examined grouped recycling 378 
by friends and neighbours together and so is not specifically related to social 379 
relationships derived from sharing the same space. Perry and Williams (2007) 380 
highlighted differences in recycling activities among different ethnic groups with 381 
British Indians being more likely to participate in a recycling scheme than their White 382 
British counterparts.  Using age, ethnicity and location as the defining variable, local 383 
authorities are divided into 4 categories in each case. 15 For example, we separate the 384 
age distribution of all UK authorities into quartiles and then for the sub-group of 385 
authorities in the same age quartile we calculate the mean recycling volume, thus sni 386 
= jR , where j refers to the jth quartile of local authorities. For each local authority, 387 
we therefore have a reference group whose recycling performance acts as the social 388 
norm for that authority. For a full list of the definitions and sources used see 389 
Appendix I. Appendix II includes the descriptive statistics of the variables used for 390 
estimation. 391 
We capture concern for the environment through the variable gsp, which 392 
denotes the area of green space per capita. We expect that the larger the per capita 393 
                                                 
15 We did test for the importance of social norms through using information, which related local 
authorities to each other on the basis of average incomes and educational attainment but the social 
norm variable was not significant. 
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green space area, the more aware individuals are of their natural environment and this 394 
will pre-dispose them towards pro-environmental behaviour, such as recycling. The 395 
link between place and behaviour has been examined in Cialdini et al. (1990) where 396 
the absence (presence) of litter makes further littering less (more) likely. The role of 397 
place in shaping pro-environmental behaviour is also addressed in Stedman (2002) 398 
and Uzzell, Pol and Badenas (2002). Since the effect on recycling from the volume of 399 
green space could also be dependent upon the degree of urbanisation, we also add as a 400 
further control the percentage of population living in an urban area, urb. The degree 401 
of urbanisation could impact upon recycling volumes since more urbanised areas are 402 
likely to be more densely populated, and as a result are more likely to be closely 403 
located to drop-off kerbside recycling facilities. This reduces the effort of 404 
non-kerbside recycling, which should raise recycling volumes.  405 
Our choice of additional control variables is motivated by the literature. Income 406 
has been shown to have both positive and negative effects on recycling volumes. For 407 
example, those earning higher income may have a higher opportunity cost of time, so 408 
the volume of recyclable material will fall (Sidique et al., 2010), whilst the literature 409 
has also suggested higher earners can afford to pay for a better environment (Berglund 410 
and Söderholm, 2003; Owens et al., 2000; Terry, 2002). Ambiguous results on the 411 
role of income may also stem from different choices of the dependent variable. For 412 
example, if the recycling rate is chosen, which is defined as volume of recycling 413 
divided by volume of waste, the effect of income can have differential impacts on the 414 
numerator and the denominator. Sidique et al. (2010) speculate that higher incomes 415 
result in higher consumption, therefore generating greater waste and thus leading to a 416 
lower recycling rate. Another possible explanation, distinct from the time element of 417 
sorting out waste is the link between income and purchasing patterns. Basing their 418 
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analysis on the opportunity cost of time argument, Saltzman et al. (1993) find that 419 
purchasing patterns shift away from goods with a higher recyclable content. However, 420 
it could be that higher earners have greater financial flexibility and so can use their 421 
discretion to purchase goods with a higher recyclable content (alluded to in Callan and 422 
Thomas (2006)). However, this explanation has yet to be tested in the literature given 423 
the difficulty of obtaining data on household budgetary allocations (Yang and Innes, 424 
1997).  425 
 Housing type (ht) is proxied by the proportion of the authority’s housing stock 426 
that is flats. Evidence would suggest that households dwelling in flats are less likely to 427 
recycle or recycle in lower quantities, partly because of their more limited space to 428 
store recyclable materials and generally because of their poorer provision of kerbside 429 
collection (Barr et al., 2001; Woodruff, pers. comm.). Consequently, we anticipate 430 
that β2 < 0. Education has also been demonstrated to be important, with recycling 431 
behaviour positively related to the level of educational attainment (Callan and 432 
Thomas, 1997; Duggal et al., 1991; Hong et al., 1993; Judge and Becker, 1993; 433 
Reschovsky and Stone, 1994). Thus, in authorities where a greater proportion of the 434 
population has a higher education qualification, the volume of recycling should be 435 
higher. Thus we anticipate that β3 > 0. Following on from our discussion above, β4 > 436 
0 indicates the presence of warm-glow. We expect β5 > 0 indicating a positive 437 
relationship between the social norm and individual household recycling behaviour.  438 
β6 > 0 confirms the hypothesis that higher environmental awareness stimulated 439 
through closer proximity to green spaces increases recycling. Finally,  β7 > 0 since 440 
more urbanised areas are likely to have a higher population density and are likely to 441 
benefit from greater proximity to recycling facilities.  442 
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 The results of estimating (8) are presented in table 1. We use a random effects 443 
panel estimator given that the variables ht and heq are time-invariant, and we are 444 
interested in their impact beyond all other individual effects, which would be 445 
unobservable. We present three models that differ in the definition of social norm 446 
used. Model (1) uses the age profile of authorities to define the social norm; model (2) 447 
uses the ethnic profile, while (3) uses the regional average recycling performance.16 448 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 449 
 Overall, the signs of the control variables are as expected. The variable ht is 450 
statistically significant in two of the three models and the estimated coefficient is 451 
negatively signed. Local authorities with a higher proportion of their housing stock 452 
accounted for by flats are expected to have a lower recycling volume per capita. Our 453 
proxies for the social norm variable are found to have a statistically significant effect 454 
on recycling variable in all three cases and the estimates have a positive sign, 455 
implying that the improved recycling performance of a reference group raises the 456 
individual recycling volumes of individual local authorities. This effect is strongest 457 
vis-à-vis age and ethnicity rather than through a regional influence. So perhaps the 458 
recycling volume of peer groups with similar socio-economic characteristics are more 459 
important than a regional influence. Interpretation of the warm glow effect from the 460 
econometric results is not so straightforward. Although we find a positive relationship 461 
between kerbside quality and recycling volumes (reflecting time spent recycling), 462 
which would indicate the presence of warm-glow, it is not significant. The area of 463 
green space has a statistically significant effect and is positively signed in all three 464 
cases, though the magnitude of the estimated coefficient would imply a slight effect 465 
on recycling volumes. 466 
                                                 
16 England is separated into nine regions, which form the highest tier of sub-national division. The 
regions are: East Midlands, East of England, Greater London, North East England, North West 
England, South East England, South West England, West Midlands, Yorkshire and the Humber. 
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 467 
6. Conclusion 468 
This paper re-examines the role of motives in determining recycling behaviour. 469 
Sticking to the definition of warm-glow provided by Andreoni (1990) and others, we 470 
provide what we believe to be is a novel approach to detecting its existence within a 471 
theoretical framework. Within that framework we also offer two ways of modelling 472 
the influence of social norms on recycling behaviour. Using random effects 473 
estimation, the roles of social norms, warm-glow and environmental concern are 474 
analysed, based on English local authority data on recycling volumes and kerbside 475 
provision. The empirical results generally confirm the hypotheses generated by the 476 
theoretical model: there is a social norm effect and the peer effect is stronger with 477 
relation to age and ethnicity rather than locality. Environmental concern is also found 478 
to be significant, albeit the effect is slight. The empirical analysis failed to establish a 479 
significant relationship between warm-glow and recycling.  480 
These results suggest that in the context of household recycling it may be more 481 
attractive to policymakers to rely on social norms rather than other measures to guide 482 
behaviour. By doing so, the burden of monitoring and enforcement can be shifted 483 
from the regulator to the community. Thus, for a given level of monitoring and 484 
enforcement effort, decentralisation may reduce costs and be more effective. Thus, 485 
rather than mandating levels of recycling, the government can use measures to 486 
activate the social norm.  The kerbside scheme is one such measure since by making 487 
recycling efforts visible amongst neighbours it promotes and sustains the social norm 488 
to recycle (Oskamp et al., 1991; Vining and Ebreo, 1990). 489 
Kreps (1997) states that if economic incentives are to complement intrinsic 490 
incentives they should emphasise the voluntary nature of the desired behaviour. To 491 
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date, policymakers in many countries have relied almost entirely on non-monetary 492 
incentives to increase recycling. In the future, should policy-makers turn to monetary 493 
incentives to drive up recycling rates further, their design of monetary incentives 494 
should take account of the non-monetary drivers affecting pro-environmental 495 
behaviour, such as recycling. 496 
 Relating our findings to the literature, we note that our empirical results 497 
conform to those obtained elsewhere, although interpretations differ. For example, 498 
Hage et al. (2009) report that while the coefficient on the social norm variable shows 499 
that it has a limited effect on household behaviour, the variable relating to the 500 
perception of others’ recycling efforts, which is estimated separately, is an important 501 
driver in how much the individual recycles. Although Halvorsen (2008) does not 502 
interpret warm-glow in the same way as we do, he does find that improving the 503 
quality of kerbside is statistically significant in increasing household recycling.      504 
Finally, given our dataset, it has proved difficult to empirically capture warm-505 
glow as well as we would like. Hence, future research will be directed at augmenting 506 
the dataset with information on time spent recycling. In addition, although we have 507 
suppressed the effect of x on recycling in the empirical model, future work will 508 
involve establishing the relationship between households’ purchasing and recycling 509 
behaviour. As Yang and Innes (1997) state there is insufficient data on household 510 
consumption patterns and Saltzman et al. (1993) have shown that there is a link 511 
between the two through the income effect. 512 
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Figure 1 Kerbside policy and response channels 520 
 521 
 522 
 523 
 524 
 525 
 526 
 527 
 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
 539 
 540 
 541 
Kerbside 
policy Individual response to policy 
Social norm 
Warm-glow 
  Enhanced visibility 
Crowding-in/crowding 
out 
(i) Norm awareness 
(ii) Conditional preference to comply 
(iii) External sanction 
 
Environmental concern 
  
Note: solid lines indicate a direct link, e.g. kerbside policy may create a norm through visibility of 
recycling activity. Dashed lines indicate that warm-glow and environmental concern may or may not be 
present. If warm-glow is present, evidence suggests that crowding-out can occur.  
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Appendix I: Data and sources 542 
 543 
   
Variable 
 
Description Source 
r 
 
log of dry recycling per capita www.wastedataflow.org 
y 
 
Log of median household income in 
constant prices 
 
Office for National 
Statistics 
ht 
 
Proportion of the housing stock that is 
flats 
 
Office for National 
Statistics 
heq 
 
Proportion of the local authority 
population that has a primary degree 
Office for National 
Statistics 
 
sn 
 
Social norm variable. Defined by the 
average recycling volume of a reference 
group of local authorities, which comes 
from the quartile the authority belongs 
to. The reference group is defined with 
respect to  
 
1. Age profile. The proportion of the 
local authority’s that is aged 65 or 
older; 
2. Ethnicity. The proportion of the 
local authority’s population that is 
white; 
3. The region of the UK which the 
local authority belongs to. 
 
www.wastedataflow.org 
&  
Office for National 
Statistics 
gsp 
 
Log of green space per capita Office for National 
Statistics 
 
kq 
 
Quality of kerbside provision. Defined 
as: 
 
scollectionbetweentimeoflength
materialsofnumbercontainerofsize
    
      ×
 
where  
 
1. size is 
 
8 = Wheeled bin 241+ litres; 
7 = Wheeled bin 181-240 litres; 
6 = Wheeled bin 120-180 litres; 
5 = Wheeled bin<120 litres; 
4 = Kerbside box >50 litres; 
3 = Kerbside Box 35-50 litres; 
2 = Kerbside Box <35 litres;  
1 = for all other methods of 
collection. 
 
 
 
 
www.wastedataflow.org 
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2. Number of materials are given as: 
 
4 = if 4 or more materials are 
collected; 
3 = if 3 materials are collected; 
2 = if 2 materials are collected; 
1 = if 1 material is collected; 
 
3. Length of time between collections, 
where:  
 
5 = less frequently than monthly 
4 = monthly 
3 = fortnightly 
2 = Weekly 
1 = more frequent than weekly 
 
urbi Percentage of the local authority 
population that lives in an urban area 
Office for National 
Statistics 
   
 544 
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Appendix II: Descriptive statistics of the data series 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
 
Minimum Maximum 
  overall between within   
       
       
r -3.834 
 
0.289 0.265 0.118 -5.281 -2.781 
y 10.094 0.145 0.144 0.026 9.769 10.749 
 
ht 17.166 13.922 14.177 - 3.41 89.48 
 
heq 19.177 6.463 2.866 5.823 9.69 48.25 
 
kq 7.027 3.418 1.656 3.006 0 17.616 
 
sn 
(age) 
 
-3.797 0.041 0.041 - -3.859 -3.708 
sn 
(ethnicity) 
 
-3.795 0.072 0.072 - -3.963 -3.719 
sn 
(regional) 
 
-3.886 0.143 0.145 - -4.143 -3.560 
gsp 
 
0.312 1.641 0.631 1.519 -4.040 3.589 
urb 66.854 34.851 35.253 - 0 100 
       
Notes: for each series we have 1887 observations and 317 local authorities, with a mean number of observations of 5.95. 
 
 
27 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 
 
Table 1: Estimation results 
 
    
Variable (1) 
 
(2) (3) 
constant -1.515 
(-1.04) 
-0.959 
(-0.61) 
-2.172 
(-1.49) 
y 0.204 
(1.86) 
0.143 
(1.38) 
0.032 
(0.30) 
ht -0.003* 
(-2.77) 
0.0006 
(0.39) 
-0.005* 
(-3.09) 
heq 0.0008 
(1.60) 
0.0008 
(1.60) 
0.0005 
(1.15) 
kq 0.001 
(1.10) 
0.001 
(1.16) 
0.001 
(0.99) 
sn 1.147* 
(3.42) 
1.141* 
(4.02) 
0.487* 
(2.87) 
gsp 0.005* 
(2.48) 
0.005* 
(2.41) 
0.003 
(1.74) 
urb 0.0002 
(0.40) 
-0.0003 
(-0.65) 
-0.0003 
(-0.61) 
    
R2 
 
0.044 0.076 0.065 
no. of 
observations 
1887 1887 1887 
    
    
Notes: random effects estimates. * indicates significance at the 5% level. Social norm is defined 
separately for models 1 to 3, using the average recycling volume of a reference group of local 
authorities. In Model (1) the social norm is defined using the age profile of the authority; Model (2) 
uses the ethnic profile; while (3) uses the average of the UK region to which the local authority 
belongs. 
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